CRT And LCD Monitor Evesdropping Through Electric Emanations

From December 2003:
"The civilian computer-security community became aware of the risk through the work of van Eck in 1985. Military “Tempest” shielding test standards remain secret and no civilian equivalents are available at present. The topic is still largely neglected in security textbooks due to a lack of published experimental data.

This report documents eavesdropping experiments on contemporary computer displays. It discusses the nature and properties of compromising emanations for both cathode-ray tube and liquid-crystal monitors. The detection equipment used matches the capabilities to be expected from well-funded professional eavesdroppers. All experiments were carried out in a normal unshielded office environment. They therefore focus on emanations from display refresh signals, where periodic averaging can be used to obtain reproducible results in spite of varying environmental noise."






They also experimented restoring a diffuse reflection from a white office wall.





http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-577.html
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-577.pdf


From March 9th, 2006:
Victim Monitor:

"It belongs to a nearby Russian stand, is about 25 meters away from our antenna. Its PowerPoint presentation is clearly readable on our eavesdropping system, which managed to isolate this signal from the many hundred PCs located in the same room."

Evesdropping System:


http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2006/03/09/video-eavesdropping-demo-at-cebit-2006/